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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates incentives for firms to increase output above the activity 
level thresholds (ALTs) in order to obtain more free allowances in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme. While ALTs were introduced in order to reduce excess free allocation to low-activity 
installations, for installations operating below the threshold, the financial gain from 
increasing output to reach the threshold may outweigh the costs. Using installation level 
data for 246 clinker plants, we estimate the effect of ALTs on output decisions. The ALTs 
induced 5.8Mt of excess clinker production in 2012 (4% of total EU output), which 
corresponds to 5.2Mt of excess CO
2
 emissions (over 5% of total sector emissions). As 
intended, ALTs do reduce overallocation (by 6.6million allowances) relative to a scenario 
without ALTs, but an alternative output based allocation would further reduce 
overallocation by 39.5million allowances (29% of total cement sector free allocation). Firms 
responded disproportionately to ALTs in countries with low demand, especially in Spain and 
Greece. The excess clinker output lead to increased EU clinker and cement exports, 
production shifting between plants and also an increase in clinker content of cement thus 
reducing the carbon efficiency of cement production.   
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1. Introduction  
The justification for using free allocations in emission trading schemes has evolved over 
time. Historically, in schemes such as the U.S. acid rain program, it was introduced as a 
compensation mechanism for the owners of existing industrial assets for a change in the 
rules of the game (Ellerman et al., 2000). A lump sum transfer would be made to existing 
assets through a predetermined amount of annual free allocations for a given number of 
years. The free allocations offset the costs to purchase pollution permits on the market. 
Such methods are termed “grandfathering”, “historic”, “lump-sum” or “ex-ante” allocation.5 
New assets would not be allowed free allocations and thus would have to pay the full permit 
price on the market. As long as the free allocations are predetermined, all assets (old and 
new) would compete on the same playing field, the price of permits would provide the same 
opportunity cost for mitigating pollution, and in theory, the output price of the goods sold 
would incorporate the price signal for consumers.  
More recently, free allocations have been explicitly used (or have been proposed to be used) 
as a way to strategically alleviate the risk of offshoring production and emissions (so-called 
“carbon leakage”) for Energy-Intensive and Trade-Exposed (EITE) sectors such as cement, 
chemicals and steel. In the absence of border carbon adjustment, the implementation of 
which is considered as politically difficult, economic theory suggests that “output-based” 
allocation (OBA) should be used (e.g. Fischer and Fox 2007, Quirion 2009, Fischer and Fox 
2012, Meunier et al 2012). Indeed an OBA scheme has been implemented within the 
Californian ETS which began in 2012 (California Air Resources Board, 2013). In contrast the 
EU ETS Phase 3 is unique in using a complex system. It combines an ex-ante calculation6 of 
an allocation and subsequent lump-sum transfer based on historic output (and multiplied by 
an emissions intensity benchmark) with a possible ex-post calculation and adjustment of 
this lump-sum according to rules related to actual capacity and activity levels as defined in 
Decision (2011/278/EU) (European Commission, 2011). Situations in which ex-post 
adjustments occur include the arrival of new entrants into the market, plant capacity 
extension/reduction, plant closure and partial cessation or recommencement of activity at 
an existing plant. These latter rules are governed by the activity level thresholds (ALT)7.  
Qualitatively, ETS schemes with ALT approximate OBA: the amount of free allocations will 
vary with the activity level, and the overallocation profits8 associated with ex-ante schemes 
will be reduced.9 The advantage of ALT rules is that they allow for a fixed cap (in fact a cap 
which will not exceed a predetermined amount for existing installations and the reserve for 
new entrants).  One disadvantage is that they introduce an element of complexity in the 
scheme. Under these non-linear rules, the lump sum transfer of allowances to EITE sectors is 
reduced by 50%, 75% or 100% if the annual level of production of the plant falls below 50%, 
25% or 10% respectively, of the historical activity level (HAL) of production that is used to 
determine the ex-ante allocation (European Commission, 2011).  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
5 The term ”grandfathering” is usually used in a narrow sense, whereby allocation is based purely on past emissions 
or output, whereas the other terms tend to also incorporate allocation methods such as the EU ETS Phase 3 rules, 
which is based on past production but is also multiplied by a benchmark.  
6 Note that ex-ante and ex-post refer to whether the calculation of the freely allocated amount of allowances occurs 
prior to or following the production and emissions for which allowances are to be allocated.  
7 New entrant provision and closing rules were already in place in Phases 1 and 2 of the EU-ETS.  A closure rule is 
also used in the Californian ETS. 
8 Overallocation profits can be distinguished from windfall profits, which refer to the profits from free allocation 
where emitters additionally profit from passing on the marginal CO
2
 opportunity cost to product prices, despite 
receiving the allowances for free. Overallocation profits can occur even in the absence of cost pass through, if 
output fall short of historic levels. 
9 Windfall and overallocation gains have been a persistent shortcoming of the use of ex-ante free-allocation 
mechanism in the EU ETS (e.g. Laing et al. 2014, Sartor et al. 2014, and Sandbag 2011). 
3"
"
A second disadvantage is that the ALTs introduce distortions, which is the focus of this 
paper. A recent study on the EU ETS impacts on the cement sector 2005-2013 (Neuhoff et al., 
2014)10 found preliminary evidence through data analysis and comprehensive interviews 
with industry executives, that new ALTs introduced in 2013 provided cement installations 
the incentive to adjust output levels. The rationale is as follows. Since the free allocation in 
year t+1 is directly linked to output in year t, if output levels lie below the threshold levels, 
there may be an incentive to increase output in year t to achieve the relevant threshold (.10, 
.25, .50) and receive higher free allocations in year t+1. In this paper, such strategic 
adjustments of output motivated by ALTs is termed “gaming” behaviour, in line with the 
management literature (e.g. Jensen, 2001). Neuhoff et al. (2014) report that in interviews, 
company executives consistently confirm these practices where the regional cement market 
demand is insufficient to reach the minimum activity level. They identify three channels to 
marginally increase production in a plant which is producing below the threshold: 
• Production shifting among local plants, i.e. reducing the production at a plant which 
is well above the threshold to increase the production at the plant which is below; 
this generates some transport costs11 so that it can be too costly to be undertaken at 
a large scale; 
• Exports of clinker to other markets so as not to perturb the local market while 
increasing production; this generates some cost in terms of export price rebate, since 
these exports would not naturally occur; 
• Increase the clinker to cement ratio, i.e. incorporate within limits more clinker in 
cement instead of using less costly cementitious additives such as slag of flying 
ashes; this directly generates some cost.   
The objective of the paper is to quantify the magnitude of these distortions, and discuss 
whether the disadvantages of ALTs balance the advantages.  
Empirical studies on this subject remain limited. Most of these studies have examined the 
distortive effects of combined ex-ante allocations with ex-post new entrant and plant closure 
provisions. Pahle et al. (2011), Ellerman (2008) and Neuhoff et al. (2006) compared the new 
entrant provision relative to auctioning. These papers argued that new entrant provisions 
distort via their impact on investment decisions (essentially by acting as a subsidy). Meunier 
et al. (2014) compared this same provision with an output-based scheme whenever firms 
face an uncertain demand. They showed the entrant provision could induce excessive new 
investments in the EU cement sector. Fowlie et al. (2012) compare ex-ante schemes with 
closure rules with an output-based scheme and show that the lifetime of old inefficient 
plants would be unduly extended with the former. None of these studies has discussed the 
impacts of the possible distortions associated with the addition of “non-linear” ex-post 
adjustments to ex-ante allocation via the use of ALTs, such as introduced in the EU ETS 
Phase 3 (2013-2020). 
While our analysis only concerns the cement sector, and has been done in a context of low 
carbon price, we think that its relevance may go beyond the sector context, and it could be 
potentially relevant to other EITEs. Altogether, we argue that the benefits of implementing 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
10 Three co-authors of this paper participated in this study and in conducting interviews that were carried out.  
11 McKinsey (2008) estimate that transport costs for a tonne of clinker from Alexandria to Rotterdam are roughly 
€20/tonne, and that inland shipping costs are approximately €3.5/tonne per 100km and inland road transport was 
about 8.6€/ton per 100km. 
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ALTs in terms of reduced overallocation profits does not outweigh the significant costs in 
the form of distortions, hence ALTs should be abandoned. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the EU ETS Phase 3 allocation rules, 
the predicted gaming behaviour from thresholds and the alternative allocation rules. Section 
3 describes our conceptual framework for evaluating the effects of ALTs, the methodology, 
data sources, as well as the key assumptions involved in our analysis. Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 concludes and discusses some policy recommendations.  
2. ETS free allocation rules and gaming of ALTs 
2.1. The EU-ETS Phase 3 free allocation rules  
In Phase 3 of the EU ETS, installations in sectors “deemed to be exposed to carbon leakage” 
are eligible to receive free allocation of emission allowances. The determination of the free 
allowances for each installation combines an ex-ante calculation, based on the historic 
output for existing installations (known as the “historical activity level” or “HAL”12) or the 
initial capacity for new installations, with an ex-post calculation based on the ongoing 
activity level of this installation as defined in Decision (2011/278/EU) (European 
Commission, 2011). The ex-post calculation provides step wise adjustments intended to 
reflect changes in market volumes. These adjustments follow complex procedures.  
For existing installations, the precise relationship that determines the next-period allocation 
from ex-ante and ex-post values is summarised by Equations 1 and 2 below. The amount of 
free allocations to an installation, i, at period t+1, for an eligible product, p is denoted A
i,p,t+1 
.   
A
i,p,t+1 
= CSCF
t
 x  B
p 
 x  HAL
i,p
  x  ALCF
t+1
(q
i,p,t
/HAL
i,p
),                    (1) 
In equation (1) CSCF
t
 is the uniform cross-sectoral correction factor13, B
p
 is the benchmark 
for product p, 14 HAL
i,p
 represents the historical activity level, q
i,p,t 
 represents the output of 
the eligible product in year t; and ALCF(q
i,p,t
/HAL
i,p
) is the activity level correction factor. The 
latter factor defines a step wise function for the thresholds. It is defined as:  
!"#$!!! !!!"# = ! 1,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ≥ 0.5! "#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!0.5,!!!!!!!0.25! "# ≤ !!! < 0.5! "#0.25,!!!!!!0.10!! "# ≤ !! < 0.25! "#!0,!!!!!!!!0! "# ≤ !! < 0.10! "# !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(2) 
For new installations, the historic activity level is replaced by the capacity, to be precisely 
determined according to the rules.15  
2.2. Gaming and thresholds 
Gaming behaviour refers to artificially increasing production to attain thresholds, in order 
to obtain more allowances. Consider a plant for which the “business as usual” activity level 
for year 2012 would be at say 40% of its historic activity level. Increasing production up to 
50% of its historic activity level allows doubling the free allocation received. A rough 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
12 The benchmarked product-related historical activity level (HAL) is defined as maximum of the median annual 
historical production of the product in the installation (or sub-installation) concerned during either 2005-2008 or 
2009-2010.  (cf. Decision (2011/278/EU)). 
13 This is determined by comparing the sum of preliminary total annual amounts of emission allowances allocated 
free to installations (not electricity) for each year over the period 2013-2020. In 2013 the CSCF is equal to 0.9427, 
then declines at 1.74% per year. 
14 Product benchmarks in general reflect the average performance of the 10% most efficient installations in the 
sector or subsector in the years 2007-2008. The benchmarks are calculated for products rather than inputs 
Decision (2011/278/EU). 
15 Guidance document n°7 in European Commission, 2011.  
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calculation with a clinker plant illustrates the potential benefit of gaming. Suppose HAL 
refers to 1 Mt/year, the business as usual is 0.4 tons so that the plant needs to increase 
production by 0.1 tons to achieve the 50% threshold. At 9 €/t CO
2
 in 2013, if the firm gets 
100% of free allowances relative to HAL it is worth 6.5 M€; losing 50% allowances implies a 
loss of 3.25 M€. Suppose the emission intensity is say 0.8 t CO
2
/t of clinker. The increase in 
emissions is then equal to 0.080 t CO
2
 which at 9 €/t CO
2
 amounts to 0.72 M€.  
In the presence of activity level thresholds, the net benefit of gaming in terms of allocations 
is the difference between the increased free allocations and the certificates needed to cover 
the increased production (in our case 2.53M€=3.25M€-0.72M€). The net benefit depends on 
the price of CO
2
, the benefit rising with the price. However, this artificial increase of 
production involves cost inefficiencies, which can be assumed increasing function of the 
extra production, independent of the CO
2
 price but dependent on the plant. These cost 
inefficiencies can up to a point cancel out the gains from increased free allocation. This is 
shown in Figure 1, where gaming is undertaken only if the increased production to attain 
the threshold is less than ∆!!. In our case, if the extra production of 0.1 ton of clinker does 
not involve cost inefficiencies of more than 2.53M€, gaming is profitable. 
Figure 1: The value of gaming. The installation engages in gaming when ∆! < ∆!!. ! refers to the 
carbon intensity of the plant. Benefits are increased free allocations minus extra emissions. 
             
Evidence of strong responses to thresholds – where small changes in behaviours lead to 
large changes in outcomes – has been found in the recent literature. Sallee and Slemrod 
(2012) find evidence that the automakers respond to notches in the Gase Guzzler tax and to 
mandatory fuel economy labels by manipulating fuel economy ratings in order to qualify for 
more favourable treatment. The management control literature also finds that managers 
tend to react strongly to the existence of a threshold. This is the case, for example, when 
bonuses depend on the achievement of a given level of sales for a sales manager, a given 
productivity indicator for a plant manager, a given return on investment for a business 
manager, a given level of the total shareholder return for a CEO, etc (Locke 2001). In a well-
known article, Jensen (2001) points out that such “gaming” behaviour is perfectly rational 
under threshold rules. He argues that these rules imply an agency cost which is largely 
underestimated and suggests that linear bonus schemes should be preferable.   
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2.3. Alternative free allocation rules 
The EU ETS Phase 3 rules can be compared with an ex ante allocation without ALTs similar 
to Phase 1 and 216 or an output-based allocation scheme. Under OBA, the next period 
allocation is determined according to an equation similar to equation (1) (with !!,!,!⟷!"#!,!×!"#$(!!,!,! !"#!,!)). The scheme therefore has no thresholds, and the historic activity 
level HAL is replaced by the previous year activity level !! so as allocations are altered on a 
continuous yearly production basis. In this paper, we will evaluate the impact of the ALTs by 
contrasting four scenarios, with their respective acronym: 
( Ex-ante free allocation with ALTs (Phase 3 allocation rules) and gaming (EXALTG) 
( Ex-ante free allocation with ALTs (Phase 3 allocation rules) without gaming 
(EXALTNG) 
( Ex-ante free allocation without ALTs (Phase 1&2 allocation rules) (EX) 
( Ex-post output based allocation (OBA)  
Scenario EXALTG corresponds to what was observed in Phase 3. Scenario EXALTNG applies 
the same rules but it is a hypothetical scenario where no gaming behaviour is observed. 
Therefore EXALTNG, EX and OBA all represent counterfactuals. 
3. Methodology and data  
3.1. Conceptual framework 
Since 2013 is the first year the threshold rule is in place, the 2012 activity level will directly 
determine the allocation allowances for 2013. Our analysis therefore focuses on outcomes 
of installations in the EU ETS in 2012. 
The preliminary results in Neuhoff et al (2014) provided evidence of distortions due to the 
thresholds, based on interviews with industry executives and comparison between 2011 and 
2012 data. The present study will attempt to quantify such distortions. This necessitates the 
elaboration of a counterfactual scenario for 2012 (what would have happened had the 
threshold rule not been implemented). A simple comparison between 2011 and 2012 would 
give inaccurate results because of underlying market trends e.g. cement consumption fell by 
13% at the EU level between 2011 and 2012. Comparing with a counterfactual enables us to 
understand the magnitude of the excess output due to ALTs, and the corresponding excess 
emissions and overallocation profits. A straightforward caveat is that our results are then 
very dependent on the counterfactual. This is why it is constructed using a method as 
robust and unbiased as possible, based on historical data and econometrics (see Appendix 
C).  
3.2. The cement sector 
Our analysis focuses on the cement sector to investigate the magnitude of distortions 
arising from ALTs for three reasons. First, it ranks amongst the highest in terms of carbon 
intensity per value added thus, the effects of free allocation rules are magnified. Second, 
unlike chemicals and steel with many product categories and differentiated impacts, the 
cement sector is characterised by relatively homogeneous products and production 
processes. Thus inferring production (activity) from emissions is more straightforward (see 
further). Third, as the sector experienced a demand collapse in the order of 50% or more 
between 2007 and 2012 in several member states (Boyer and Ponssard, 2013), the ALT rules 
were likely to have been more a relevant factor for operational decisions during the period 
of investigation. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
16 The difference being than phase I and II did not have benchmarks and CSCF. 
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The cement production process can be divided into two basic stages: production of clinker 
from raw materials and the subsequent transformation of clinker into cement by grinding 
with other mineral components. Clinker production accounts for the bulk of carbon 
emissions in cement production, and the reduction of the clinker-to-cement ratio is one of 
the most efficient ways of mitigation in the sector. Further, allocation under the EU ETS is 
based on a benchmark on clinker rather than cement or hybrid benchmark17. 
3.3. Distinguishing between installations above and below thresholds 
As described in Section 2.1, allocation is determined by q/HAL, however, data on installation 
activity levels (i.e. clinker output) are not publicly available. However, it is possible to infer 
clinker plants’ activity levels inferred from plant level emissions data, which are available 
from the European Union Transactions Log (EUTL). That is, it is possible to use the observed 
ratio of publically-reported verified emissions (E) relative to the Historical Emissions Level 
(HEL), to proxy the share of unobserved activity level relative to Historical Activity Level 
(HAL) i.e. E/HEL ≈ q/HAL.18 This approximation is possible owing to the very strong and 
direct relationship between production of clinker, a highly homogeneous product, and 
emissions. Indeed the emissions intensities of clinker production have changed only very 
marginally in the EU in recent years between 2005 and 2012 (GNR Database). 
However, in distinguish between installations that are above or below thresholds (25% and 
50% of q/HAL), an element of uncertainty is introduced due to the approximation of plant 
activity level based on emissions data. As detailed in A1., we ensure that installations are 
correctly identified using 2013 allocations data. This reveals whether or not the installation 
had seen its allocation reduced because of 2012 activity levels. 2013 allocation data also 
allowed us to obtain clinker carbon intensity at the plant level (see Appendix A.2). 
Therefore, we are able to assess production at the plant level through emissions (Appendix 
A.3). 
3.4. Estimating counterfactual production and trade 
For every installation, we estimate a counterfactual output level, to contrast with the 
observed one. To do so involves three steps and a number of assumptions (detailed in 
Appendix C). First, we use a simple fixed effects panel regression to predict clinker 
production (installation level fixed effects) using regional level cement consumption as the 
main explanatory variable. Counterfactual cement and clinker export levels are similarly 
predicted using regional level cement consumption as the main explanatory variable. We 
find that on average, if cement consumption in a region decreases by 1 Mt, clinker 
production tends to decrease by 0.65 Mt and clinker net exports increase by 0.16 Mt (see 
Appendix C.1). This assumes that changes are uniform across all installations in a region. 
We then relax this assumption and make corrections based on individual plants 
characteristics calibrated on historic data (see Appendix C.2). In developing the 
counterfactual, cement consumption and price are assumed to be independent of allocation 
rules, i.e. they would have been the same in 2012 whatever the allocation scheme considered 
in the paper. We return to this assumption in Section 3.6." 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
17 The hybrid benchmark avoids the “clinker-cement paradox” (Demailly and Quirion 2006).”. If the benchmarked 
product is cement, plants have an incentive to outsource clinker production. If it is clinker, the incentive to reduce 
the clinker-to-cement ratio is lost. In California, the benchmarked product is “adjusted clinker and mineral 
additives produced”, which is equal to !!(1 + !!), where !! ! is the clinker produced, ! is the clinker ratio and ! is the 
“mineral additives ratio” (limestone and gypsum consumed divided by cement produced). This system gives an 
incentive to use more mineral additives while preventing clinker outsourcing.  
18 HEL is calculated in the same way as the HAL (Cf. Section 1) but using emissions as a proxy for clinker production 
activity. 
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Having estimated counterfactual production levels by installation, we then proceed to 
estimate the number of free allowances (EUA) received at the plant level under the various 
scenarios. As an example, let us consider a plant19, which is functioning at 50% E/HEL and 
receiving 1 million EUAs. Suppose that our econometric model finds that the counterfactual 
activity of this plant is 40%. This plant would have received 0.4 million EUAs under OBA, 1 
million EUAs under EX and EXALTG, 0.5 million EUAs under EXALTNG. 
In this short example, we see that gaming from 40% to 50% allows obtaining 0.5 MEUAs 
more allowances, but involves 0.11 Mt CO
2
 of additional emissions20, so that the net gain in 
terms of allowances is 0.39 MEUAs. To convert the various effects into monetary value, we 
assume a CO
2
 price at 9€/EUA. We consider that the increased production is sold at 
marginal cost, and so has no impact on profits.  
In summary, for the four different scenarios, we compute production, emissions and 
allocation. The net allowances (allocation minus emissions) is compared for the scenarios 
EX, EXALTNG, EXALTG and OBA. Comparing other scenarios to OBA gives an estimation of 
overallocation profits (in MEAUs or M€). The difference between EXALTG and EXALTNG 
gives the effect of gaming. Table 1 summarises how allocations and production are obtained 
under each scenarios.  
Table 1: Scenarios 
Scenarios Allocations Production 
OBA 
Proportional to Activity 
(HALxALCF <->q in Eq (1)) 
Counterfactual  
(explained in Appendix C) 
EX 
Independent of Activity 
(ALCF=1 in Eq (1)) Same as OBA 
EXALTNG 
Hybrid 
(Eq (1)) Same as OBA 
EXALTG Same as EXALTNG Actual 2012 Production 
3.5. Decomposing the destination of excess clinker produced 
Which strategies do firms pursue, to increase output and gain free allocations when demand 
is low? We take a further look at the distortions from ALTs by assessing the relative 
importance of the different channels through which the excess EU clinker meets its destiny. 
Comparing counterfactual net exports to real net exports gives the part of the excess clinker 
production which is destined for clinker exports and cement exports. Assuming no 
stockpiling, the remaining part is attributed to the change in the clinker ratio.  
3.6.. Moderate and low demand countries  
We suspect that the most important differences between scenarios EX and EXALTG will 
occur in countries in which cement and clinker consumption in 2012 fell well short of 
historical consumption level and hence ALT rules are relevant. The 26 EU ETS member 
states21 with ETS-participating clinker production plants, are divided into two groups (see 
Table 2). The first group of countries are where the average domestic cement consumption 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
19 Caution, this plant does not have the same characteristics as the one in section 2.2 (in order to make 
computations easier) 
20 Assuming that the plant has a clinker carbon intensity of 800kg CO
2
 per ton of clinker. 
21 Note that Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta have no listed clinker plants in the EUTL database, while data for Cypriote 
plants was not able to be exploited due to missing data.   
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in 2011-2012 was less than 70% of 2007 levels.22 We name this group “low demand” (LD) 
countries. We shall detail some of the results for Greece and Spain, two LD countries 
particularly affected by the downfall. The LD countries represented 51% of EU ETS cement 
emissions in 2008 and 40% in 2012.  The remaining countries are classified as “moderate 
demand” (MD).  
Table 2: Moderate- (MD) and low demand (LD) countries in terms of cement consumption in 2012 
relative to 2007 levels23 
Low Demand (LD) Countries  Moderate Demand (MD) Countries 
Ireland, Spain, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Baltic 
countries  
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden and 
United Kingdom 
3.7. Key assumption 
In terms of the construction of the counterfactual, our central hypothesis is that cement 
consumption and price are independent of allocation method. This assumption may at first 
appear at odds with the economic literature (Fischer and Fox 2007, Demailly and Quirion, 
2009). Ex-ante free allocations would ordinarily not provide any protection against leakage 
(they are a lump sum transfer and firms marginal cost fully support the cost of carbon) 
while ex-post OBA allocations would (with OBA, firms receive free allocation proportional to 
their output the marginal cost is unchanged and there are no competitive impacts with 
respect to imports; this is the usual argument in favour of OBA). Cement consumption and 
price would then depend on the allocation scheme. This paper departs from this view. 
Rather, it assumes that firms adopt exactly the same pricing and production decisions in 
their home market in OBA and ex-ante allocation. This assumption is supported by a series 
of in depth interviews with cement sector actors (Neuhoff et al, 2014) to explicitly show why 
there has been no leakage. These interviews point out a number of reasons for such 
behaviour: The ex-ante free allocations have been obtained precisely to mitigate leakage thus 
a risk of losing future free allocations if regulators observe the ability to pass on the cost of 
carbon without observing leakage; the long term risk of attracting new entrants into the 
market from elevated prices (i.e. limit pricing); the risk of drawing the attention of 
competition authorities due to abnormal profit levels. This paper finds these arguments 
persuasive and thus assumes that the allocation rule has no impact on consumption and on 
prices of cement in the EU. The crux of our analysis concerns their impact on the production 
of clinker and cement.    
3.8. Data  
To examine the effects of ALTs on the cement sector, 246 clinker producing installations 
were identified as operating in 2010, 2011 and 2012.24 Other variables are obtained at the 
country level as summarised in Table 3. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
22 The average of 2011 and 2012 was taken since both years are relevant to the analysis that follows here. 2007 is 
taken as the reference year since this was the year in which demand peaked in most EU Member States prior to the 
economic crisis of 2008.  
23"There are no clinker plants in Malta, Lichtenstein and Iceland. Emissions data on two clinker plants of Cyprus is 
available from 2012 only, hence cannot be used in this analysis. 
"
24 For this purpose, we rely heavily on the work carried out by Branger and Quirion (2014), which has developed an 
installation level dataset for the EU cement sector with clinker producing installations identified. 
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Table 3: Data sources 
Variable Source 
Emissions and HEL EUTL 
Clinker net exports 
(NE
K
) 
Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/setupdimselection.do# 
Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/setupdimselection.do#, 
International Trade, EU Trade Since 1988 by HS2, 4, 6 and CN8).  
Data is originally given by country pairs. Total net exports are re-computed. 
Product category: “Cement Clinker” (252310) 
Cement net exports 
(NE
C
) 
Eurostat 
Product category: Difference between “Cement, incl. cement clinkers” (2523) 
and “Cement Clinker” (252310). 
Cement consumption 
(C
C
) 
1) Cembureau (2013) for the main European countries 
2) VDZ (http://www.vdz-online.de/en/publications/factsandfigures/cement-
sales-and-consumption/, Table C10) for Baltic countries and Norway. 
Clinker production 
(Q
K
) 
EUTL-derived estimation (through estimated clinker carbon intensity and 
emissions, see A1). Where there were data gaps, supplementary data were 
obtained from several sources e.g.:  
• National cement association data when reliable and exploitable, i.e. 
Spain 
(https://www.oficemen.com/Uploads/docs/Anuario%202012%281%29
.pdf, p90) 
• Germany (http://www.vdz-
online.de/en/publications/factsandfigures/cement-data-at-a-glance/, 
table A2) 
• France (http://www.infociments.fr/publications/industrie-
cimentiere/statistiques/st-g08-2012, Table p7) 
• Getting the Numbers Right database (GNR, 
http://wbcsdcement.org/GNR-
2012/index.htmlhttp://wbcsdcement.org/GNR-2012/index.html, 
indicator 311a) for available countries (UK, Italy, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Austria)  
4. Results  
4.1. Impact of ALTs on the plant distributions 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of plant activity levels for 2012 (EXALTG), the 
counterfactual production (EX, EXALTNG, OBA) and also the distribution in 2011 for 
comparison. In LD countries, there is a marked jump in installations operating around the 
25% and 50% activity level thresholds in 2012, whereas the counterfactual distribution for 
these countries is not skewed at the thresholds. We find that in LD countries where 117 of 
the 246 cement installations are located, ALTs should have reduced free allocations in 42 
of them, but due to gaming, it was reduced in only 20 installations in reality. Thus, in line 
with preliminary findings of Neuhoff et al (2014), these results show clearly that cement 
companies have indeed altered plant production levels in response to ALT rules. In MD 
countries, this response is noticeable but to a much less degree. The contrast between LD 
and MD shows the importance of the demand collapse in triggering this gaming behaviour.   
"
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Figure 2: Distribution of installations according to their activity level (approximated by E/HEL) in 
2012 for observed and counterfactual production.  
 
 
"  
4.2. ALT impacts on clinker production and emissions 
Table 4 gives the clinker production and the emissions for 2012 (EXALTG) and the 
counterfactual (EX, EXALTNG, OBA). The excess clinker production due to the introduction 
of thresholds rule is quantified. It represents an increase of 12% in LD countries, 21% for 
Spain and 42% for Greece. These increases are extremely large, even if the global impact at 
the EU level is more modest (5%). The increase in the clinker production translates into 
increases in emissions. Altogether we estimate that an additional 5.2 Mt CO
2
 (+5 % for the 
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sector as a whole) have been emitted by EU cement firms as a consequence of the strategic 
behaviour of cement companies25.  
Table 4: Production and Emissions for the observed (EXALTG) and counterfactual (EX, OBA, 
EXALTNG) scenarios 
 LD 
countries 
 
MD 
countries 
All 
countries 
Spain Greece 
Production (CF) in Mtons 48.7 79.3 127.9 13.2 3.9 
Production (observed) in Mtons 54.4 79.4 133.8 16.0 5.6 
Increased Production in Mtons 5.7 0.1 5.8 2.7 1.7 
Emissions (CF) in Mtons CO
2
 42.7 67.5 110.2 11.4 3.5 
Emissions (observed) in Mtons CO
2
 47.8 67.6 115.3 13.7 5,0 
Increased emissions in Mtons CO
2
 5.1  0.1    5.2  2.4  1.5 
4.3. Impact of gaming on plant distribution on the free allowances 
Table 5 gives the amount of EUA’s that are allocated to cement installations under the four 
scenarios (EX, EXALTNG, EXALTG, OBA). If installations received 100% of their allowances 
regardless of their activity (i.e. the allocation under the EX scenario), then LD countries and 
MD countries would have received 74.5 and 70 million EUAs respectively. OBA allocations 
would lower allocations to 37.1 and 61.5 million EUAs respectively. The decrease in 
allocations is more significant for LD countries because the average activity is much lower. 
As explained, the scenario EXALTNG can be seen as an imperfect approximation of the OBA 
rule. If there had been no gaming, it would have set the allocations at 58.7 and 68.6 million 
EUAs. Thus for the cement sector as a whole, ALTs reduced overallocation in 2012 by 6.6 
MEUSs compared to the scenario without ALTs. Had OBA been implemented instead, 
overallocation would have been further reduced considerably by 39.5 MEUAs, which 
corresponds to 29% of the total cement sector free allocation in 2012. The theoretical effect 
for the MD countries is negligible, as most of installations have an activity level superior to 
50%. However for LD countries the theoretical effect of the threshold rule as an 
approximation of the OBA rule would have been more significant: a 42% (that is (74.5 – 
58.7)/(74.5 – 37.1)) reduction should have been obtained. With gaming (EXALTG) a reduction 
of only 16% prevails (that is (74.5 – 68.4)/(74.5 – 37.1)). For Spain the percentages would 
respectively be 57% and 21%; and for Greece 71% and 24%.  
Table 5: The Free Allowances (MEUAs) under the four scenarios 
Allocations LD countries MD countries All countries Spain Greece 
EX 74.5 70.0 144.5 23.6 8.7 
EXALTNG 58.7 68.6 127.4 15.8 4.6 
EXALTG 68.4 69.6 138.1 20.7 7.3 
OBA 37.1 61.5 98.6 10.0 2.9 
4.4. Financial potential gain associated with gaming 
In the calculation of the potential gain we assume that the increased production is sold at 
marginal cost, and so has no impact on profits. This gives an upper bound for the profits 
that could be achieved with gaming since it does not take into account the possible 
inefficiency costs: logistics cost for production shifting, extra sales expenditures and 
rebates for increased exports, opportunity cost for increasing the clinker to cement ratio). 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
25 This increase can be decomposed as 5.1 Mt CO
2 
due to a scale effect (more production) and 0.1 Mt CO
2 
 due to an 
intensity effect (carbon-intensive plants being more used). 
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That there are inefficiency costs can be seen from the fact that not all plants achieved the 
50% threshold, but some gaming was certainly worthwhile since a large proportion of plants 
did manage to get to the target. 
To convert the increase in free allowances and the increase in emission rights into monetary 
value, we need to assume a CO
2
 price. It should be clear that the amount of profitable 
gaming is dependent on the CO
2
 price. We shall come back to this point in our discussion of 
the results.  
Table 6 gives the potential profit associated with gaming for a CO
2
 price at 7.95€/t, which 
corresponds to the average future price  (December 2013) during year 2012.26 
Table 6: Quantification of the monetary value of excess free allocations for the various scenarios. 
Millions of € 
relative to OBA LD MD All Spain Greece 
EX 297 68 365 109 46 
EXALTNG 172 57 228 47 14 
EXALTG 208 64 272 67 23 
 
For LD countries, the potential gain of EX relative to OBA is estimated through the net 
increase of allowances which is 74.5 – 37.1 Mt CO
2
 and a EUA price 7.95€/t which makes 297 
M€. With the introduction of the threshold rule this increase would have been only 172 M€ 
had the firms not gamed the scheme. The reduction is coming from the reduced amount of 
free allocations due to the downfall in market demand.  
The gaming increases the amount of free allocations but increases emissions, bringing a 
potential gain at 208 M€, which represents an increase of 18% relative to 172 M€.27 For Spain 
the per cent increase is 41% and for Greece it is 62%. These figures are substantial even 
though the carbon price was low at that time. This explains why firms indulge in the various 
inefficiencies described earlier to capture part of this gain.  
4.5. Where does the excess clinker end up? Indirect evidence revisited 
This section revisits the indirect evidence of excess clinker production proposed by Neuhoff 
et al. (2014). As noted, three channels have been identified, production shifting, exports 
increase and clinker ratio increase. 
a) Production shifting in multi-plants companies. Cement company executives in 
interviews reported that subsequent to the introduction of ALTs, it was frequent practice to 
arrange production levels across plants to ensure being above the threshold at as many 
units as possible (Neuhoff et al. (2014). We observe output behaviour consistent with these 
statements in several cement companies which have a number of plants producing close to 
the thresholds. Table 7 presents four examples28. In each of these firms in 2012, production 
(within the same geographical region) simultaneous falls in production in one plant which 
produced well above the threshold in 2011, and rises to above the threshold in another 
plant which was previously operating below the threshold.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
26 Source: ICE database (http://data.theice.com/MyAccount/Login.aspx) 
27 Note that our methodology estimates the overallocation profit using the level of free allocations for year 2013 
based on activity levels in year 2012 while their emissions in 2013, for which they have to pay certificates, depend 
on actual emissions in 2013, while we use the counterfactual for 2012. 
28 We only display here groups of installations belonging to a country-company that are the most consistent with 
production shifting, but avoid cherry-picking individual installations.  For the four cases, all installations of a 
certain country-company are displayed. 
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Table 7: Evidence of within-firm-country production shifting to meet thresholds 
Country-Company Installation E/HEL 2011 E/HEL 2012 
Greece-W 1 34% 49% 
Greece-W 2 77% 66% 
Greece-W 3 11% 0% 
Spain-X 1 42% 50% 
Spain-X 2 57% 46% 
Spain-X 3 68% 56% 
Hungary-Y 1 41% 46% 
Hungary-Y 2 68% 50% 
Portugal-Z 1 34% 64% 
Portugal-Z 2 55% 51% 
Portugal-Z 3 71% 60% 
Note: We recall that if E/HEL>45%, then the installation is above the threshold 
b) Exports. Table 8 gives net exports of clinker and clinker embedded in cement from 2010 
to 2012 for LD and MD countries. We observe a surge in clinker net exports in LD countries: 
5.88 Mt in 2012, compared to 1.94 Mt and 1.56 Mt in 2010 and 2011 respectively. In contrast 
MD countries remained small net importers of clinker and no significant shift was observed 
in their trade patterns. Further analysis revealed that these clinker exports in 2012 were 
destined mainly to countries in Latin America and Africa, including Brazil, Togo, Ghana, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mauritania and Nigeria, which could have imported from Non 
EU various sources. 
Table 8: Clinker net exports in 2010, 2011 and 2012 in LD and MD countries in millions of tonnes  
LD Countries 2010 2011 2012 
Clinker 1.94 1.56 5.88 
Clinker in Cement 5.12 4.09 5.75 
    
MD Countries 2010 2011 2012 
Clinker -0.87 -0.43 -0.37 
Clinker in Cement 2.39 2.78 2.63 
Note: Source: Eurostat we use a common clinker ratio of 75% to compute clinker embedded in cement 
c) Clinker ratio. Another way excess clinker production might materialise is in a higher 
clinker-to-cement ratio. That is, firms could use more clinker to produce the same ton of 
cement. The clinker ratio can be recomputed at the macro level (state of group of states) 
with the formula!! = !!!!"!!!!!"! , where  !! is the clinker production, !"!  and !"!  net exports 
of clinker and cement, and !!  the cement consumption (see Appendix B for explanation and 
Table 3 for data source).  
Table 9 shows the clinker ratio for the MD countries, LD countries, Spain and Greece. The 
historical declining trend in the clinker-to-cement ratio has reversed in 2012.   
Table 9: Clinker-to-Cement Ratio in selected areas (source: authors' analysis) 
Clinker Ratio 2010 2011 2012 
MD Countries 76% 76% 77% 
LD Countries 74% 72% 74% 
Spain 79% 76% 82% 
Greece 76% 71% 75% 
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4.6. Decomposing the channels for clinker disposal 
Our econometric model allows for deriving counterfactuals for net exports of clinker and 
cement (See Appendix C). Assuming no stockpiling, we can attribute the remaining excess 
clinker output to clinker ratio increase thereby decomposing into three destination 
channels. The cement consumption was remarkably low in 2012. Because of the 
consumption/export relationship established by the econometric model, clinker net exports 
would have risen anyway in 2012 compared to 2011 had the threshold rule not be 
implemented. This point need be taken into account in the analysis.  
Table 10 details the results. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation. For LD countries, 
net exports of clinker increased by 6.2 Mt while our counterfactual is 4.6 Mt (+1.6 Mt); the 
net export of cement increased by 8.5 Mt while the counterfactual is 6.1 Mt (+1.7Mt of 
clinker embedded); this implies that 2.4 Mt of clinker went into the increased content of 
clinker in cement. This latter figure represents an increase of 4% relative to our 
counterfactual for the clinker to cement ratio as defined in the previous section. 
Table 10: Real and counterfactual net exports of clinker and cement (Mt) 
 
Total 
Increase 
2012  
Clinker Net Exports 
2012  
Cement Net Exports Clinker Ratio 
Region 
Production 
Clinker CF 
 Obse 
rved Diff CF 
Obse 
rved Diff*R Effect Relative 
All LD 5.7 4.6 6.2 +1.6 6.1 8.5 +1.7 2.4 + 4% 
All MD 0.1 0.4 -0.7 -1.1 3.3 2.7 -0.4 1.7 + 2% 
All 5.8 5.0 5.5 +0.5 9.4 11.2 +1.3 4.0 + 2% 
Spain 2.7 2.2 3.4 +1.2 2.2 2.6 +0.3 1.2 + 7% 
Greece 1.7 0.5 1.8 +1.3 1.5 1.7 +0.2 0.2 + 4% 
 
Figure 3: Routes of excess clinker  
 
5. Conclusions and policy options 
An important change in the EU-ETS phase 3 for EITE concerns the introduction of the 
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would reduce the overallocation profits in case of downfall in the demand: whenever the 
activity level of an installation falls below some threshold (50%, 25%, 10%) relative to its 
historic activity level used to allocate free allocations, the allocation would be reduced 
accordingly (50%, 25%, 0%).  
Our ex post analysis of year 2012, the first year in which the threshold rule applies, focused 
on the cement sector, a sector in which approximately half the EU countries had experienced 
a significant downfall in consumption (LD countries). It provides a natural experiment to 
evaluate the consequences of this rule.  
Our main conclusion is that while ALT did reduce to some extent overallocation profits, it 
also created operational distortions which lead to outcomes inconsistent with the low 
carbon transition of EU energy intensive industries. The reduction in overallocation profits 
is less than expected because of the gaming behaviour of the industry to achieve the 
thresholds, during periods of low market demand. Thanks to the elaboration of a 
counterfactual, we have been able to quantify that after the introduction of ALTs: the 
potential overallocation profit with gaming is 272 M€ (2 €/t clinker) and 228 M€ without 
gaming, while it would have been 365 M€ in the absence of ALT. The expected reduction in 
windfall profits due to the ALT is 38% while the actual reduction is 25%. The incentives are 
magnified in low demand countries, where profit with gaming is 208 M€ (3.8 €/t clinker) and 
172 M€ without gaming, while it would have been 297 M€ without ALTs. We examined three 
ways in which firms’ operations are altered in response to ALTs: shifting production among 
plants, increasing net exports of clinker and cement, increasing the clinker to cement ratio.  
In the 2000’s top management attention on the issues of climate change emerged as an 
important dimension of corporate social responsibility and a large number of companies got 
involved into proactive strategies to limit their own emissions (Arjalies et al., 2011).  The EU-
ETS positively contributed to turn this strategy into operational practise by putting a price 
on carbon. The distortions reported in our study are particularly detrimental in this respect: 
the production shifting goes against the restructuring of the assets to achieve scale 
economies, a key factor of cost efficiency in cement; the increased exports induce some 
relocation of foreign cement consumption in the EU, while the EU-ETS intention in giving 
free allocations was designed to reduce leakage, i.e. the relocation of EU consumption in 
foreign countries; the increase in the clinker to cement ratio goes against one of the main 
drivers to limit emissions in cement production. The introduction of ALT reversed the 
alignment of objectives between corporate social responsibility and the EU-ETS.   
Our results have been obtained in a context of low carbon price, severe downfall in market 
demand, and large free allowances. A higher carbon price would make our results even more 
relevant, the higher the carbon price the higher the incentive to achieve the thresholds.29 
Had we observed growth, the threshold rule would have been inactive and the reserve for 
new entrants rule would have been the issue to be analysed. Anecdotic evidence30 suggests 
likely distortions in that case as well and it would be interesting to carry out a rigorous 
analysis similar to this one.     
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
29 Take a EUA price at 20€/t a simple extrapolation for LD countries would bring up the potential wind fall profit to 
236*20/9 = 524 M€. However if we assume that all plants achieve the 50% threshold, a reasonable assumption for a 
EUA price at 20€/t, it would go up to 583 M€. The expected reduction remains at 42% but the actual one drops to 
22%. 
30 If the historic activity level (HAL) refers to say a 60% capacity utilization rate, increasing production to 80% may 
not be beneficial since it will increase emissions with no increase in free allowances; in case of capacity expansion 
the detailed rule to determine the level of free allowances may induce an artificially high production during the 
period used to fix that level. Ref. private conversation with industry representatives. 
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These considerations suggest that the threshold rule should be abandoned for sectors such 
as cement for which carbon costs represent a significant share of production costs. This 
raises the question of what to put in its place for such sectors. Theory suggests that 
replacing free allocation with full auctioning and using border carbon adjustments offers 
the most efficient solution, yet politically this solution has not yet gained serious traction. 
Since the problem arises in part because the thresholds create an allocation system that fall 
between an ex-ante and ex-post scheme, one solution would be to move to full ex-post 
output-based allocation.   
However, a number of issues must be carefully investigated before going in that direction. 
We can think of the following points: OBA implies the loss of an absolute cap for free 
allocations, OBA stifles any possibility for prices to be passed down the value chain, OBA 
may create a heavy administrative burden, and the declining trend in the caps to 
decarbonize the economy over the long term is incompatible with a benchmark to mitigate 
leakage. There are on-going discussions on how to circumvent these issues. For example the 
loss of demand side substitution incentives could be restored with a consumption charge 
(Neuhoff et al 2014). Output based scheme with hybrid benchmark has been implemented in 
California in 2012. An ex post study on this implementation would be welcome to see if, 
again, the devil lies in the details. 
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Appendix  
A. EUTL Data computations'
A.1 Determination of the Activity Level Correction Factor (ALCF
2013
) at the plant level 
The key challenge is to correctly distinguish installations that are above or below thresholds 
(25% and 50% of q/HAL), despite the limitation that activity levels have to be approximated 
using emissions data (E/HEL). To do so, we exploit the observations from the 2013 
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allocation data, which revealed whether or not the installation had seen its allocation 
reduced because its 2012 activity level fell below a threshold. Allocations in 2013 are equal 
to (cf equation (1)): !!,!"#$ = !"!#!"!"×!!×!"#!×!"#$!,!"#$ 
Where  !"!#!"#$  is the 2013 Cross Sectoral Correction Factor (0.9427),  !! the clinker carbon 
intensity benchmark (766 kg CO
2
 per ton of clinker), and  !"#! the Historical Activity Level 
of installation ! (in tons of clinker). Transforming the previous equation, where both !"#! 
and !"#$!,!"#$ are unknown, we obtain: !"!#!"#$× !!!! ×!"#!!!,!"#$ = 1!"#$!,!"#$× !!,!"#!!  
Noting !!,!"# = !"#!!"#! (corresponding approximately to the clinker carbon intensity for the HAL 
producing years), and !! is the average clinker carbon intensity (863 kg CO2 per ton of 
clinker, GNR, indicator 321) in 2008. We chose 2008 to proxy HAL production (not the 
highest level of production, which is 2007, but close). 
The ratio at the left part of the equation can be computed with available data. On the right 
part, we have  !"#$!,!"#$, which we want to find, and the ratio,!!!,!"#!!  , which is unknown as 
well but  bounded and likely to be close to 1. Indeed, !!,!"# varies in an extreme range from 
720 kg CO
2
 per ton of clinker to 1300 kg CO
2
 per ton of clinker (and for the very large 
majority of the plants from 780 to 950 kg CO
2
 per ton of clinker), which translates into a 
ratio 
!!,!"#!!  varying from 0.83 to 1.51 (and most likely from 0.90 to 1.10). Then, if the ratio, is 
comprised between 0.83 to 1.51 (respectively between 1.67 and 3.01, and between 2.64 and 
4.8031), we infer that   !"#$!,!"#$ = 1, (respectively 0.5 and 0.25).  
 
This enabled catching out situations in which imperfections in the E/HEL measure as a 
proxy for the q/HAL would have led to a false conclusion about whether an installation was 
truly above or below its activity threshold in 2012. We found that the actual thresholds for 
the E/HEL measure that matched the 2013 allocation data were slightly lower in practice, at 
22% and at 45%, rather than 25% and 50%. Discussion with industry experts revealed that 
there was a logical explanation for this systematic bias: clinker producers often have more 
than one kiln inside an installation that is treated as a single unit for free allocation 
purposes. When demand falls, it is common to concentrate production in the most efficient 
kiln(s). Thus emissions may fall by slightly more than overall clinker production, creating a 
slight downward bias in E/HEL as a measure of q/HAL in low demand countries. This bias 
could also be explained by the clinker carbon intensity improvement between HAL years and 
2012. 
A.2 Determination of clinker carbon intensity at the plant level 
Once the !"#$!,!"#$ has been determined at the plant level ! (see previous section), the plant 
clinker carbon intensity for HAL years, !!,!"# , can then be obtained with the previous 
equation. 
For 20 plants (out of 246), we found an unusual number (below 700 kg CO
2
 per ton of 
clinker), possibly due to a capacity increase, and put instead a default value equal to  !!.We 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
31 There is actually a gap between 2.14 and 4.01 in the data so no case of overlapping. 
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also set the default value !! when !!,!"#$ = 0 (meaning !"#$!,!"#$ = 0 or plant closure), making 
the computation impossible (15 plants). 
We then correct the first approximation of clinker carbon intensity so as weighted average32 
clinker carbon intensity in big countries corresponds to GNR data in 2008 (818, 831, 832, 
797, 847, 858, 849 and 842 kg CO
2
 per ton of clinker for respectively Austria, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom). Finally we correct 
values of clinker carbon intensity in plants of other countries in the same way, so as the 
European weighted average clinker carbon intensity (!!). 
A.3 Clinker production  
Once clinker carbon intensity is estimated for each plant, clinker production can be 
obtained through emissions (!!,!,! = !!,!×!!,!"#, ). We assume that clinker carbon intensity 
does not evolve over time. 
Further, we proxy the plant capacity with the formula !! = !"#!∈[!""#;!"#!] !!!!,!""#  (maximal historical 
production). 
B. Robustness check - Macro data consistency at the national level 
If we denote the six different variables: 
• Q
K 
clinker production 
• Q
C
 total cement production 
• NE
K
 clinker net exports 
• NE
C
 cement net exports 
• C
C
 cement consumption 
• R clinker-to-cement ratio 
We have two equations translating the conservation of cement on the one hand and the 
conservation of clinker on the other hand (neglecting stockpiling): !! = !! + !"! !! = !×!! + !"! 
These equations must be verified for each country every year (for real of counterfactual 
scenario).  
In this paper for real data, Q
K
, NE
K
, NE
C
 and C
C
 are obtained through different sources (see 
Table X), and Q
C
 and R are re-computed (we have  ! = !!!!"!!!!!"!). 
C. Counterfactual Production and Net Exports 
C.1Macro level 
Our central hypothesis is that cement consumption is independent of allocation rules. 
Therefore, cement consumption would have been the same in 2012 had the threshold rule 
not been implemented. 
Cement consumption is then our main variable to “predict” clinker production and net 
exports of clinker and cement. We do a panel regression based on years 2008 to 2011 (post-
crisis, to avoid a time break): 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
32 The Weights are production, as multiplying plant emissions by this first approximation of clinker carbon intensity 
gives a first approximation of clinker production at the plant level (!! ,!,!""# = ! !!,!"#×!!,!""#). 
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∆!!",! = !! + !!∆ !,!,! + !!,! ∆!"!",! = !! + !!∆!!,!,! + !!,! ∆!"!",! = !! + !!∆!!,!,! + !!,! ∆!!",!   (respectively  ∆!"!",!  , ∆!"!",!!  and ∆!!,!,! ) means variation of clinker production 
(respectively clinker and cement net exports, and cement consumption) between year ! − 1! 
and year  ! in region !. 
Regions are almost identical to countries. In order to minimize measurement errors which 
would bias the regression, we regroup some small countries into larger entities which are 
coherent in terms of regional market: Baltic countries, Benelux, Norway-Sweden and 
Slovenia-Italy. There are then 20 different regions in the regression, and 3 time periods 
(2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011), so 60 points. 
Table 11: Regression results of the regional panel data regression 
 ∆!!!,!!
(Clinker 
Production) 
∆!"!",!!
(Clinker Net 
Exports) 
∆!"!",!!
(Cement Net 
Exports) !! 0.646*** 
(5.81) 
  
!!  -0.162** 
(2.36) 
 
!!   0.025 
(0.55) !! 0.73 0.41 0.01 ! 60 60 60 
Hausman Test 3.60 (0.06) 2.92 (0.09) 5.00 (0.02) 
Modified Wald Test for 
groupwise heteroskedascitity 
2.4E6 
(0.00) 
7.5E6 (0.00) 2.6E6 (0.00) 
Note: *,** and *** means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
Results are displayed in Table 11. Constant are not displayed (they are close to 0 and 
statistically insignificant). As suggested by the Hausman test (if p-value are low, fixed effects 
are preferred), we used a fixed effect model.  As the modified Wald test reveals the presence 
of heteroskedasticity, we present robust standard errors obtained with Huber-White 
estimator. 
The fit is very good for the clinker production (!! = 0.73), good for the clinker net exports 
(!! = 0.41) but not good for cement net exports (!! = 0.01): changes in cement consumption 
do not predict changes in cement net exports. We find a positive term for   !! and a negative 
term for !! as expected:  a decrease in cement consumption involves a decrease in clinker 
production but an increase in clinker net exports. Regarding numerical figures, we find that 
on average, if cement consumption decreases by 1 Mt, clinker production decreases by 0.65 
Mt and clinker net exports increase by 0.16 Mt. These relationships allow (small) 
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endogenous clinker ratio variations (mostly downward) through the previous macro 
equations. 
For a region !, we then compute counterfactual net exports as: !"!,!!"#!!!" = !"!,!!"## + !!∆!!,!,!"##!!"#! 
with !! = 0.162 and !"!,!!"#!!!" = !"!,!!"## + !!∆!!,!,!"##!!"#! = !"!,!!"## 
Counterfactual production respects the relationship  ∆!!",! = !!∆!!,!,! (with !! = 0.65) and is 
established at the micro level (plants). Explanations are given in the next section.  
C.2 Micro level (production) 
We name !!,! = !!,!!"#!  the activity of plant ! in year ! (ratio of emissions divided by historic 
emissions level). Invidual plant production of clinker is then given by !!,!,! = !!,!×!"#!!!,!"#    where !!,!"#! is the clinker carbon intensity of the plant (supposed time invariant). 
A prior estimation of the counterfactual activity is given using the previous macro relation. 
We suppose in a first time that the change in production is uniform across all installations 
belonging to the same region: ! ,!!"!!"#$" = !!,!!!×(1 + !!∆!!,!,!;!∋!!!!!,!,!;!∋! ) 
However the change in production may not be uniform in the different installations of a 
region. We thus investigate different potential biases. For that we regress the error 
(!!,! − !!,!!"!!"#$") on different plant-specific variables (we use estimations from 2009 to 2011): !!,! − !!,!!"!!"#$" = !! + !!!"#!,!,!∋! + !!ℎ!"ℎ!,!,!∋! + !!!"#"!$%&! + !!!"#$%#&! + ! 
Variables are: 
• !"#!,!,!∋!  is a dummy variable equal to one if the activity of the plant in year ! − 1 is 
lower than 10% of the average activity level of the region where the plant is (happens 
a bit more than 20% of the cases). 
• ℎ!"ℎ!,!,!∋!  is a dummy variable equal to one if the activity of the plant in year ! − 1 is 
higher than 10% of the average activity level of the region where the plant is 
(happens a bit more than 20% of the cases) 
• !"#"!$%&! is the capacity of the plant (in Mt), proxied by the maximimum historical 
production. 
• !"#$%#&!,!  is a dummy variable equal to one if the plant is located near the coast (less 
than 50km, this was done thanks to the geolocalization of the plants in the EUTL 
data). It concerns 61 plants out of 246. 
Counterfactual activities are re-estimated each year using the precedent year (errors are not 
piling up), so there is no suspicion for autocorrelation, and we use a standard regression. As 
the Breush-Pagan test reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity, we present robust 
standard errors obtained with Huber-White estimator. Results are displayed in Table 12. 
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Table 12: Regression results of the plant level econometric model for production !"#  0.076***  
(4.78) ℎ!"ℎ  -0.105 
(1.24) !"#"!$%&  -0.005 
(0.48) !"#$%#& -0.040*** 
(3.40) 
constant 0.006 
(0.45) !! 0.06 ! 738 
Note: *,** and *** means statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
We find a significant bias for plants functioning at low activity levels. That is, with a uniform 
production change, we tend to underestimate the activity level of those plants by 7.6 
percentage points on average. A reasonable explanation is that low activity plants 
are more maintained for profitability. 
As there is no statistical significance for the parameter  ℎ!"ℎ  , we deduce that the 
production adjustment is made through all the other plants, and not only the high 
producing plants. Further, the parameter !"#"!$%& is not statistically significant: big or small 
installations adjust to the regional demand in the same way. 
Finally, the parameter !"#$%#& is statistically significant and negative. It means that with a 
uniform production change, we tend to overestimate the activity of coastal plants. This is 
surprising as we could expect the opposite (coastal plants producing more, e.g. their 
production declining less, in order to export). It could simply mean that coastal plants 
production declines more than the other plants as a strategy of cement companies.  
We use the results of this past regression to correct prior estimations with the distortion 
(only for !"#! and !"#$%#& which are statistically significant), then we renormalize activity at 
the region level to satisfy the macro change in production: !!,!!"!!"#$%&$ = !!,!!"!!"#$" + !!!"#!,!,!∋! + !!!"# !"#! 
!!,!!"!!"#$% = !!,!!"!!"#$%&$× !!,!!"#$"!!,!!"#$%&$ 
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Figure 4: Predictions of E/HEL at year n based on E/HEL at year n-1 and respective change in 
consumptions for 2009-2011 
 
Results of this method for years 2009 to 2011 are displayed in Figure 4 (comparing 
actual and estimated activity at the plant level). The uncertainties are relatively 
large, but there is no systematical bias in the estimation. That is, in our 
counterfactual scenario, some plants may wrongly be attributed an activity below 
the threshold, but the underestimation of allowances for these plants is 
compensated by an overestimation of allowances for others plants (for which we 
wrongly attribute an activity above the threshold). 
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